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Abstract 43 
Now more than ever animal studies have the potential to test hypotheses regarding how 44 
cognition evolves. Comparative psychologists have developed new techniques to probe 45 
the cognitive mechanisms underlying animal behavior, and they have become 46 
increasingly skillful at adapting methodologies to test multiple species.  Meanwhile, 47 
evolutionary biologists have generated quantitative approaches to investigate the 48 
phylogenetic distribution and function of phenotypic traits, including cognition.  In 49 
particular, phylogenetic methods can quantitatively (1) test if specific cognitive abilities 50 
are correlated with life history (e.g. lifespan), morphology (e.g. brain size), or socio-51 
ecological variables (e.g. social system), (2) measure how strongly phylogenetic 52 
relatedness predicts the distribution of cognitive skills across species, and (3) estimate the 53 
ancestral state of a given cognitive trait using measures of cognitive performance from 54 
extant species.  Phylogenetic methods can also be used to guide the selection of species 55 
comparisons that offer the strongest tests of a priori predictions of cognitive evolutionary 56 
hypotheses (i.e., phylogenetic targeting).  Here, we explain how an integration of 57 
comparative psychology and evolutionary biology will answer a host of questions 58 
regarding the phylogenetic distribution and history of cognitive traits, as well as the 59 




  64 
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Why do some species make tools or learn what to eat from conspecifics whereas others 65 
do not?  Why are some species more risk averse than others when faced with a gamble? 66 
Do different diets, social systems, or constraints on growth systematically shape the 67 
evolution of different cognitive skills across species? Or is variance in cognitive skills 68 
explained more simply by phylogeny? One of the main goals of comparative 69 
psychologists is to document variation in problem-solving abilities across species to 70 
reveal the processes by which cognition evolves (Thorndike 1911; Hodos and Campbell 71 
1969; Rumbaugh and Pate 1984; Torigoe 1985; Sherry et al. 1992; Kamil 1998; Papini 72 
2002; Shettleworth 2010).  One rationale for this research is that if we understand how 73 
cognition evolves in nonhumans, this knowledge may in turn inform our understanding of 74 
how our own species’ cognitive abilities have evolved (Yerkes 1943; Byrne and Whiten 75 
1988; Dunbar 1992; Povinelli 1993; Hauser 1996; Tomasello and Call 1997; Parker and 76 
McKinney 1999; Matsuzawa 2001; Barrett et al. 2002; Hare 2007; Haun et al. 2010). 77 
Outside of comparative psychology, evolutionary biologists have developed a 78 
suite of quantitative tools to test hypotheses regarding evolutionary processes. These new 79 
phylogenetic comparative methods have revolutionized research in evolutionary biology 80 
challenging historical views about topics ranging from the common ancestor of life on 81 
earth, to evolutionary transitions such as the Cambrian explosion (Harvey and Pagel 82 
1991; Harvey et al. 1996; Martins 1996; Pagel 1999; Nunn 2011). 83 
In this article we explain how a synthesis between comparative psychology and 84 
evolutionary biology allows for unprecedented opportunities to investigate cognitive 85 
evolution.  We then illustrate this potential by applying several phylogenetic comparative 86 
methods to an example data set.  We conclude with suggestions to promote future 87 
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progress, in particular by promoting large-scale collaborations to construct larger 88 
comparative datasets that are needed to test a priori hypotheses about cognitive 89 
evolution.  90 
Background 91 
 Since its inception, comparative psychologists have been interested in the 92 
possibility of species differences in cognition.  Many of the large-scale comparative 93 
studies to date were conducted early in the field’s history (Thorndike 1911; Harlow et al. 94 
1950; Harlow 1953; Bitterman 1960, 1965; Rumbaugh and Pate 1984).  Despite their 95 
broad taxonomic focus, many of these early efforts focused on universal laws of learning 96 
and often interpreted species differences within the framework of scala naturae. As the 97 
notion of universal learning processes gained prominence within psychology (e.g.  98 
Skinner 1938; Harlow 1953; Watson 1967), many researchers abandoned a phylogenetic 99 
perspective in favor of a model species approach, from which they aimed to develop 100 
‘general process’ cognitive models.  101 
 As early as the 1950’s, several pointed critiques argued that comparative 102 
psychologists had lost sight of their original agenda and documented the diminishing 103 
diversity of animal species under study (Beach 1950; Hodos and Campbell 1969; 104 
Lockard 1971; Czeschlik 1998; Papini 2002).  As the cognitive revolution took hold in 105 
the study of human psychology, many of the same cognitive concepts and approaches 106 
began to be applied to the study of animal psychology across a wider range of species 107 
(Griffin 1978; Cheney and Seyfarth 1990; Bekoff et al. 2002). Over the last two decades 108 
the diversity of species under study has grown further and has generated renewed interest 109 
in testing hypotheses regarding how cognitive differences across species might have 110 
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evolved (Shettleworth 2009; Fitch et al. 2010; Shettleworth 2010). As a result, the field 111 
of comparative psychology is currently positioned to address questions of cognitive 112 
evolution from new perspectives within a phylogenetic comparative framework.  113 
Tinbergen’s challenge.  What do psychologists have to gain by taking a 114 
phylogenetic comparative approach?  This question is best answered by first 115 
acknowledging the existence of four fundamentally different questions that comparative 116 
researchers are positioned to address — each of them uniquely informative, yet all of 117 
them complementary (Tinbergen 1963).  The first two questions concern the ontogeny 118 
and causal mechanisms of cognition and have been the focus of comparative psychology 119 
since its inception (Darwin 1859, 1872; Morgan 1894; Thorndike 1911; Skinner 1938; 120 
Watson 1967). The third question involves the phylogeny (history and distribution) of 121 
cognitive abilities across the animal kingdom, while the fourth concerns the function(s) of 122 
cognitive skills (how does cognition impact survival and reproduction?). Pursuing all four 123 
lines of inquiry is the most powerful approach to understanding the evolution of any 124 
phenotypic trait (Tinbergen 1963; Shettleworth 2010). However, the last two questions of 125 
phylogeny and function, that address how, when, and why a cognitive trait evolved, are 126 
intractable without a phylogenetic comparative perspective, and have historically been 127 
the most challenging for comparative psychologists to pursue. 128 
Consider the case of social learning.  Psychologists have devoted much effort 129 
toward delineating different causal mechanisms underlying social learning in different 130 
animal species (Tomasello and Call 1997; Fragaszy and Perry 2003; Galef and Laland 131 
2005; Horner and Whiten 2005; Whiten and van Schaik 2007; Hoppitt and Laland 2008; 132 
Shettleworth 2010; Rendell et al. 2011). Psychologists have also examined the ontogeny 133 
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of these mechanisms in several taxa (e.g. Langer 2006; Matsuzawa et al. 2006; Huffman 134 
et al. 2010), and quantitative methods are available to help discriminate between social 135 
and asocial learning (Reader and Laland 2002; Franz and Nunn 2009; Kendal et al. 2009; 136 
Matthews 2009; Reader et al. 2011);  however, we are only just beginning to describe the 137 
phylogenetic distribution of the different types of social learning processes. We also 138 
remain limited in our ability to quantitatively test the evolutionary function of the social 139 
learning skills observed in different species.  Without recourse to questions of 140 
phylogenetic history and function we cannot understand how or when species evolved to 141 
differ cognitively. Moreover, we cannot test why certain lineages – including humans – 142 
have evolved the cognitive abilities they possess.  143 
Phylogenetic Comparative Questions.  Comparative psychologists have worked 144 
toward answering several different questions regarding the phylogeny and function of 145 
cognition.  While progress has been made toward testing evolutionary hypotheses, 146 
phylogenetic methods are needed to overcome the constraints of current approaches. 147 
Below we mention only a few important questions that have guided comparative 148 
psychological research; however, the theoretical and methodological issues discussed 149 
apply to any cognitive hypothesis one wishes to examine. 150 
A first important question is if differences in particular cognitive abilities 151 
correlate with changes in independent variables, such as life history, ecological, or social 152 
factors.  For example, the social intelligence hypothesis has provided a guiding 153 
framework for comparative studies for decades (Jolly 1966; Humphrey 1976; Byrne and 154 
Whiten 1988; Cheney and Seyfarth 1990; Harcourt and de Waal 1992; Kummer et al. 155 
1997; Dunbar 1998a; de Waal and Tyack 2003; Whiten 2003; Barrett and Henzi 2005; 156 
Phylogenetic Comparative Psychology 8 
Dunbar and Shultz 2007; Holekamp 2007).  According to this hypothesis, increases in 157 
social complexity drove the evolution of cognitive flexibility in primates. This hypothesis 158 
leads to the prediction that changes in social complexity on different evolutionary 159 
lineages should be coupled with changes in the cognitive abilities required to live in 160 
increasingly complex social groups.  161 
Comparisons on actual cognitive tests of species that live in social systems of 162 
differing social complexity offer the strongest test of the social intelligence hypothesis 163 
because they provide a direct comparison of species’ cognition in a specific domain (e.g.  164 
Bond et al. 2003; MacLean et al. 2008). However, such studies have rarely been 165 
conducted with large taxonomic samples; more typically, pairs of closely related species 166 
are compared, often with different tests used for different pairs of species. Each study 167 
therefore provides a single comparison (N = 1) and it is difficult to generalize results 168 
across species. Consequently, researchers have primarily tested the predictions of the 169 
social intelligence hypothesis with larger-scale comparative analyses in which an 170 
anatomical proxy for cognitive ability (e.g. relative brain size) is related to a social 171 
feature (e.g.  Barton 1996; Lefebvre et al. 1997; Dunbar 1998a; Reader and Laland 2002; 172 
Isler and van Schaik 2009).   173 
Although analyses of anatomical proxies for cognition (e.g. brain size) allow 174 
researchers to analyze large comparative datasets, they rely on the assumption that 175 
cognition is a one-dimensional, general-purpose mechanism that varies only 176 
quantitatively (Healy and Rowe 2007). Empirical evidence suggests that there is no one-177 
to-one relationship between cognitive flexibility and brain size, while cognitive skills 178 
across different domains are not necessarily highly correlated with each other either 179 
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within or across species (Hare et al. 2002; Emery and Clayton 2004; Herrmann et al. 180 
2007; MacLean et al. 2008; Herrmann et al. 2010b; Liedtke et al. 2010; but see Deaner et 181 
al. 2006; Banerjee et al. 2009, Reader et al. 2011). Thus, actual comparisons of problem 182 
solving behavior are essential for testing hypotheses regarding cognitive evolution 183 
(Tomasello and Call 2008). As described below, phylogenetic comparative methods 184 
provide an opportunity to quantitatively examine the relationship between a direct 185 
measure of cognition and one or more explanatory variables (e.g. socio-ecological, life 186 
history, or morphological traits). 187 
A second important question for comparative psychologists is how strongly 188 
phylogeny predicts cognitive variation across species.  For example, do apes possess 189 
derived cognitive abilities not found in other primates? Progress on this question has been 190 
made through several meta-analyses and major literature reviews, sometimes with 191 
conflicting conclusions.  In their comprehensive review, for example, Tomasello and Call 192 
(1997) suggested there were no fundamental differences between the cognition of 193 
monkeys and apes.  Meanwhile, based on a review of much of the same literature but 194 
focusing on non-social skills, Deaner et al. (2006) argued that apes consistently 195 
outperform monkeys on most cognitive measures. Although these reviews synthesized 196 
tremendous amounts of research and suggested important hypotheses to test, they relied 197 
on indirect comparisons simply because few studies existed that directly compared 198 
monkey and ape species on the same tasks (e.g. Amici et al. 2010).  In the following 199 
section we introduce the latest phylogenetic methods that will allow researchers to 200 
quantitatively assess the degree to which closely related species share similar trait values.  201 
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A third question that comparative psychologists address concerns the ancestral 202 
state for cognitive abilities. Consider the case of mirror self recognition (Gallup 1970).   203 
Because great apes tend to show self-directed behavior in response to their image in a 204 
mirror, but monkeys do not, the prevailing view is that this form of visual self-205 
recognition evolved in primates after the divergence of the ape and Old World monkey 206 
lineages.  Although this example may indicate a qualitative cognitive transition between 207 
two clades, the majority of cognitive traits likely evolve along more subtle dimensions 208 
and will not cleanly map onto major lineages of a phylogeny.  For example, a variety of 209 
species have been tested on their understanding of object permanence (Piaget, 1954), 210 
with considerable diversity in performance across taxa that does not map cleanly onto 211 
any major phylogenetic grouping (Tomasello and Call 1997; Shettleworth 2010).  A 212 
phylogenetic comparative approach allows for analysis of this interspecific variation and 213 
can be used to make inferences about the likely traits of extinct species.  It can also be 214 
used to pinpoint when (in time) and where (in phylogeny) important cognitive changes 215 
have occurred. For example, did the last common ancestor of all living primates have 216 
stage 5 object permanence? What evolutionary transitions were important for the 217 
evolution of these skills? New phylogenetic methods can address these questions and 218 
place statistical confidence intervals on the resulting evolutionary estimates. 219 
Phylogenetic Comparative Methods 220 
Thanks to the advances comparative psychologists have made in describing the 221 
psychology of animals, the field is now in a position to address a range of evolutionary 222 
questions including 1) to what degree phylogeny predicts the cognitive abilities of 223 
different taxa, 2) if particular cognitive abilities are correlated with anatomical, 224 
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ecological, or social factors, 3) what the ancestral state for a given cognitive ability may 225 
be, and 4) which species provide the strongest test of an evolutionary hypothesis.  Here 226 
we explain the phylogenetic comparative methods (Figure 1) that will be critical to 227 
answering these questions. To help illustrate the utility of these methods we conducted 228 
example analyses on a dataset of 12 primate species tested in a cognitive task measuring 229 
inhibitory control (Amici et al. 2008; MacLean et al. unpublished data).  We conducted 230 
the following example analyses using the R programming language (R Development 231 
Core Team 2011) implementing the ape (Paradis et al. 2004) and geiger (Harmon et al. 232 
2009) packages. Additional resources for learning about phylogenetic methods are listed 233 
in Table 1. 234 
 Inhibitory control – the ability to resist a prepotent behavioral response – is 235 
central to solving many problems (Diamond 1990; Hauser 1999) and has been linked to 236 
social competence, criminal behavior, health, and economic status in humans (Mischel et 237 
al. 1989; Moffitt et al. 2011).  In our example task we assessed the ability of 12 primate 238 
species to inhibit a prepotent motor response in favor of detour. As a subject watched, 239 
food was placed behind a transparent barrier. To successfully retrieve the food, subjects 240 
needed to resist reaching directly for the food (i.e. bumping into the transparent barrier) 241 
and instead, perform a detour around the barrier. A correct choice was scored when a 242 
subject’s first response was to reach around the transparent barrier to retrieve the food. 243 
Figure 2 shows the mean percent of correct choices made by each species and this score 244 
was used as the dependent measure in each of the analyses below.  The procedure used 245 
with lemurs differed from that used with monkeys and apes so data from the two tasks are 246 
combined here strictly for illustrative purposes. 247 
Phylogenetic Comparative Psychology 12 
Using Phylogenies. To test evolutionary hypotheses researchers must first obtain 248 
information about the evolutionary relationships of the species they are studying.  Today, 249 
it is easier than ever to acquire existing phylogenies, and digital versions of phylogenetic 250 
trees can be downloaded via a number of user-friendly sites (e.g. 251 
http://10ktrees.fas.harvard.edu, Arnold et al. 2010). For a review of phylogeny 252 
construction see (Felsenstein 2004) . Phylogenetic trees can be used to investigate a wide 253 
array of questions in biology and have become essential for modern biological research. 254 
Therefore, obtaining a phylogeny for a comparative sample is commonly the first step in 255 
testing evolutionary hypotheses. Many comparative phylogenetic statistical methods 256 
require that branch lengths reflect the amount of time since lineages diverged, and that is 257 
true in the phylogeny for species in our dataset (Figure 2; consensus tree downloaded 258 
from http://10ktrees.fas.harvard.edu).  In cases for which the phylogeny is uncertain, 259 
analyses can be conducted across tree blocks to explore how differences in branch 260 
lengths or tree topology (the hierarchical arrangement of the species) affects results.  See 261 
Huelsenbeck et al. (2000) and Pagel and Lutzoni (2002) for further discussion of 262 
comparative analyses in the context of phylogenetic uncertainty.  263 
Phylogenetic Signal. Because closely related species share much of their 264 
evolutionary history, we typically expect that they resemble one another morphologically 265 
(e.g. body size) more so than distantly related species (Harvey and Pagel 1991).  This 266 
resemblance due to shared evolutionary history is termed phylogenetic signal. Many 267 
behavioral phenotypes also exhibit phylogenetic signal (Freckleton et al. 2002; Blomberg 268 
et al. 2003; Thierry et al. 2008), and the same principle is likely true for cognition.  The 269 
strength of this association with phylogeny can be informative.  For example, a lower 270 
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amount of phylogenetic signal may reflect high levels of individual differences within a 271 
species, substantial error in measurement of the trait, or suggest that independent 272 
variables (e.g. social/ecological) have influenced the evolution of the trait relatively 273 
independently from phylogeny (Blomberg et al. 2003; Ives et al. 2007).  Similarly, 274 
phylogenetic signal may be low for traits that are highly conserved among all taxa in a 275 
phylogeny (e.g. vertebrate body plans).   276 
 For example, in an analysis of 119 traits, Blomberg, Garland, and Ives (2003) 277 
showed that anatomical traits (e.g. body size) tended to exhibit more phylogenetic signal 278 
than behavioral traits (e.g. daily path length), corroborating the long-held notion that 279 
behavior is more evolutionarily labile than morphology (i.e. "behavioral drive",  Mayr 280 
1963).  In analyses of comparative data, weak phylogenetic signal may indicate that strict 281 
phylogenetic statistical approaches are not needed (Abouheif 1999) or may not be 282 
particularly informative (e.g. when reconstructing ancestral states on the tree, see below). 283 
Therefore, determining the strength of phylogenetic signal in a given data set facilitates 284 
the use of appropriate statistics and guides decisions regarding how to interpret statistical 285 
results. Recent methodological advances provide a way to assess phylogenetic signal with 286 
quantitative metrics, and even to scale the branches of a phylogenetic tree to reflect the 287 
strength of phylogenetic signal (Freckleton et al. 2002; Blomberg et al. 2003). 288 
Before discussing how to measure and incorporate phylogenetic signal, it is 289 
important to define several key terms and ideas relevant to phylogenies.  Phylogenetic 290 
trees consist of branching patterns typically emanating from a root (the common ancestor 291 
to all species in the tree) leading to the tips, which represent the extant species (and 292 
terminal branches for any extinct species that are included in the phylogeny).  The 293 
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internal branches of the tree represent the time that species have shared evolutionary 294 
history, while the branches leading to the tips reflect the time that each lineage has been 295 
evolving independently of other species in the phylogeny. For a review of how to read 296 
and interpret phylogenies see (Baum et al. 2005; Baum 2008). 297 
One measure of phylogenetic signal is the parameter λ, “lambda” (for other 298 
measures see Blomberg et al. 2003).  Lambda scales the internal branches of a phylogeny 299 
to maximize the likelihood of the observed trait distribution under a Brownian motion 300 
model of trait evolution (Pagel 1999; Freckleton et al. 2002). Brownian motion emulates 301 
a random walk of the trait along the different branches of the phylogeny, with the 302 
expected variance accumulating proportionally to evolutionary time. In this model, the 303 
amount of similarity between two species is directly related to the length of their shared 304 
evolutionary history. The parameter λ is a multiplier of the internal branches that ranges 305 
between 0 and 1.  By incorporating λ, the phylogeny can be rescaled to reflect the amount 306 
of phylogenetic signal in the data.  An important concept here is that the rescaled 307 
phylogeny is not a new estimate of species divergence times, but rather an estimate of 308 
how closely covariance in the dependent measure matches the expected covariance based 309 
on species’ relatedness.  Thus, when λ = 0, all internal branches are rescaled to zero, 310 
which indicates that the trait distribution shows no association with phylogeny (i.e., a star 311 
phylogeny; all the branches emanate from a single node). When λ = 1, branch lengths 312 
reflect the actual divergence dates for each lineage, indicating that variance in the trait 313 
has accumulated over time as predicted by Brownian motion. For many traits, λ falls 314 
between zero and one (or slightly greater than 1). Estimates of λ that are significantly 315 
greater than zero provide evidence for phylogenetic signal in the data. The parameter λ 316 
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can estimate phylogenetic signal in the raw data (e.g. species values for a trait) or 317 
alternatively in the residual variance from a phylogenetic regression (Revell 2010).  In 318 
the latter case, λ estimates if the deviations from the predicted values in a phylogenetic 319 
regression are correlated with species’ expected covariance due to shared evolutionary 320 
history. To illustrate a phylogeny transformed at various values of λ, we rescaled the 321 
phylogeny of species in our data set to reflect λ = 0, λ = 0.5, and λ = 1 (Figure 3).  322 
In our example data set the maximum likelihood estimate of λ for the cognitive 323 
data was near to 0 indicating that more closely related species do not have more similar 324 
trait values.  However, the example data set, which is relatively large by comparative 325 
psychology standards, is a small sample for comparative phylogenetic analysis.  326 
Consequently, we cannot rule out the possibility that low statistical power is responsible 327 
for the lack of phylogenetic signal observed.  Indeed many methods to detect 328 
phylogenetic signal perform poorly with datasets of less than 20 species (Freckleton et al. 329 
2002). One way to test if the maximum likelihood estimate of λ produces an improved 330 
model for the data is to use a likelihood ratio test to assess if this estimate is significantly 331 
better than a model in which λ is fixed to 0 (no phylogenetic signal) or 1 (covariance 332 
between species is directly proportional to shared evolutionary history). These tests 333 
reveal that the maximum likelihood estimate for λ does not provide a better fit to the 334 
cognitive data than a model in which λ is fixed to 0 (Likelihood ratio = ~0, p = 1.0) or 1 335 
(Likelihood ratio = 2.85, p = 0.09). This finding highlights the importance of generating 336 
large comparative cognitive databases in order to test if particular cognitive traits exhibit 337 
phylogenetic signal (i.e. with a larger sample we would have more confidence in the lack 338 
of phylogenetic signal in our sample analysis).  339 
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 Correlated Evolution. A common way to investigate adaptive hypotheses involves 340 
testing whether two or more traits covary across species. If two traits are functionally 341 
linked (e.g. food storing behavior and spatial memory;  Shettleworth 1990) and one trait 342 
changes (e.g. increased dependence on stored food), we expect selection for changes in 343 
the relevant cognitive trait (e.g. increases in spatial memory - Clayton and Krebs 1994; 344 
Shettleworth 1995; Balda and Kamil 2006; Pravosudov and Smulders 2010).  Tests for 345 
correlated evolution allow us to assess whether these associations exist while controlling 346 
for the sharing of traits through common descent.  347 
 An assumption of standard correlation and regression analyses is that data points 348 
(e.g. each species) are statistically independent of one another.  However, because species 349 
values in comparative studies may be similar due to descent from a common ancestor, 350 
this assumption is commonly violated, and it is this non-independence that results in 351 
phylogenetic signal.  With a phylogeny, it becomes possible to examine correlated 352 
evolutionary change directly along the branches of the tree, for example with the method 353 
of independent contrasts (Felsenstein 1985; Garland et al. 1992; Nunn and Barton 2001). 354 
Alternatively, one can use the phylogeny to statistically control for non-independence in 355 
the underlying data, for example by using phylogenetic generalized least squares (PGLS) 356 
(Grafen 1989; Pagel 1999).   357 
To illustrate this approach, we tested whether increases in relative brain size 358 
(using data from Isler et al. 2008) were associated with increases in performance on the 359 
inhibitory control task in our example data set. We constructed a PGLS model, which is 360 
essentially a regression model in the following form:  Inhibitory Control Scores = ß1 * 361 
Body Size + ß2 * Brain Size + ε.  Importantly, the error term (ε) accounts for the co-362 
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distribution of the residual variation in inhibitory control scores that we would expect 363 
based on the phylogenetic relationships of the species.  The aim is to estimate β1 and β2 364 
and assess their statistical significance.  By also estimating λ, we quantitatively assess the 365 
degree of phylogenetic signal and take that into account in the statistical model (i.e., we 366 
scale the original phylogeny represented by ε by replacing the last term in the equation 367 
above with λ*ε). 368 
Our PGLS example analysis shows a trend toward species with relatively larger 369 
brains having greater inhibitory control  (β2 = 66.93, p = 0.06), indicating a possible 370 
functional link between these traits. In this case, we allowed λ to be estimated at its 371 
maximum likelihood value, which was 1.02 and therefore indicates that related species 372 
show similar deviations in inhibitory control relative to the expected value based on 373 
relative brain size (i.e. λ estimate is for the residuals of the model). To examine how 374 
including phylogeny in the analysis affects results, we conducted the same analysis with 375 
λ fixed to 0.  This analysis produced a much weaker association between brain size and 376 
inhibitory control (β2 = 19.4, p = 0.49).  377 
This difference in outcomes reflects an often under-appreciated aspect of 378 
phylogenetically-informed research: analyses incorporating phylogenetic information 379 
increase statistical power to detect real relationships, while reducing the probability of 380 
erroneously inferring significance when no association exists (Garland et al. 1992; Rohlf 381 
2006).  The take-home message is that by meeting the assumptions of the underlying 382 
statistical methods, phylogenetic approaches provide superior statistical performance in 383 
terms of reducing both false positives (type I error rates) and false negatives (i.e., 384 
increasing statistical power).   385 
Phylogenetic Comparative Psychology 18 
Thus, the use of phylogenetic analysis truly is a win-win proposition.  We 386 
therefore anticipate that analyses of correlated trait evolution will allow comparative 387 
psychologists to expand on the paired-species comparisons that provide a first step, but 388 
not the most powerful test of hypotheses about cognitive evolution. For example, by 389 
applying this technique across a large range of species we will be able to address whether 390 
reliance on stored foods is robustly associated with enhanced spatial memory, as 391 
suggested by paired comparisons of several bird species (Shettleworth 1995). 392 
Reconstructing Ancestral States. Because cognitive performance does not 393 
fossilize, one cannot directly measure the cognitive traits of extinct species; however, 394 
new phylogenetic methods allow researchers to reconstruct values at the ancestral nodes 395 
in a phylogeny, and to place statistical measures of confidence on these reconstructions 396 
(Schluter et al. 1997; Garland et al. 1999; Pagel et al. 2004).  These reconstructions can 397 
then be considered in relation to fossilized proxies for cognition (e.g. endocast features, 398 
artifacts, or ancient DNA). As an example of character reconstruction with confidence 399 
intervals, we used maximum likelihood techniques to estimate how an extinct species at 400 
the root node of our phylogeny (Figure 2) would have performed on the example 401 
inhibitory control task. We generated the ancestral reconstruction for performance on our 402 
example inhibitory control task that maximizes the probability of the observed data under 403 
a Brownian motion model of evolution.  The reconstructed score at the root node of the 404 
phylogeny is 57% correct on the cognitive task with a 95% confidence interval from 28% 405 
to 86% correct. With this estimate of the ancestral state we can now consider why some 406 
species have strongly diverged from this ancestral state – such as Macaca fascicularis, 407 
Pongo pygmaeus, and Pan troglodytes – whereas others have not.  Essentially, the 408 
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ancestral state gives us a baseline by which to judge how divergent any extant species is 409 
from an ancestral state when further testing evolutionary hypotheses.    410 
From our ancestral state analysis we also obtain an estimate of how confident we 411 
should be about the trait reconstruction at any node where it has been estimated. When 412 
confidence intervals are relatively narrow compared to the variation observed in the 413 
species sampled, this suggests that certainty in an ancestral reconstruction is warranted.  414 
For example, the reconstructed value for the last common ancestor of chimpanzees and 415 
bonobos is 88% with a confidence interval of 83-94%, while the reconstructed value for 416 
the last common ancestor of lemurs is 55% with a confidence interval of 36-74%.  Thus, 417 
it is likely that the last common ancestor of apes would have performed better on this task 418 
than the ancestor of lemurs (keep in mind, however, that results from different procedures 419 
were pooled for this analysis). Because the confidence interval at the root node in our 420 
example encompasses most of the variation in extant species, it warns against drawing 421 
strong conclusions about the species at the root of the phylogeny. Even with such wide 422 
confidence intervals, however, we can investigate whether particular species, such as 423 
humans, fall inside or outside confidence intervals placed on values found across great 424 
apes, or primates as a whole (Nunn 2011). Thus, the ability to assess confidence in such 425 
reconstructions is an important advantage of model-based reconstruction methods, such 426 
as maximum likelihood, over methods like parsimony which simply generate a point 427 
estimate (Losos 1999).  Lastly, although our example analysis uses a continuous 428 
dependent measure, ancestral state reconstructions can also be conducted with discrete 429 
data (Pagel and Meade 2006).  430 
Phylogenetic Comparative Psychology 20 
Phylogenetic Targeting. A comparative approach to cognition requires that we 431 
build large datasets across a diverse range of species.  Given finite resources and time it 432 
is prohibitive to collect data on all possible species in a large group of organisms, such as 433 
primates.  Instead, we can obtain greater value for our time and effort by collecting data 434 
on fewer species that provide stronger tests of a particular hypothesis and better control 435 
of confounding variables and alternative hypotheses.  As a general rule, closely-related 436 
species tend to provide a statistically powerful comparison, because on average, they 437 
introduce the fewest confounding variables.  However, it is possible to be more 438 
systematic when choosing species for comparisons using methods such as “phylogenetic 439 
targeting” (Arnold and Nunn 2010), which can be implemented via a user-friendly web 440 
page (http://phylotargeting.fas.harvard.edu/). Because phylogenetic targeting accounts for 441 
phylogeny and potential confounding variables, it offers a powerful and principled 442 
statistical approach for building the comprehensive databases needed to test cognitive 443 
evolutionary hypotheses.   444 
Here, we provide an example of phylogenetic targeting using the example from 445 
above, in which we detected a trend (p = 0.06) for species with relatively larger brains to 446 
exhibit better performance on the cognitive test of inhibitory control (incorporating 447 
variation in body mass and phylogeny). To more convincingly test whether the trend we 448 
observed hints at a meaningful relationship between relative brain size and inhibitory 449 
control, we could increase our statistical power by expanding the data on inhibitory 450 
control (plentiful data are already available on brain size). One way to increase the 451 
statistical power is to strategically choose a few additional data points (i.e. species) that 452 
maximize variation in the independent variable.   453 
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To determine which species would provide the strongest test of the evolutionary 454 
relationship between inhibitory control and relative brain size we used phylogenetic 455 
targeting to identify eight paired comparisons that would maximize contrasts in brain size 456 
(measured as residual endocranial volume, or ECV) while maintaining phylogenetic (and 457 
thus statistical) independence.  Importantly, we restricted the targeting process along two 458 
parameters, which are easy to implement in the program:  (1) among potential species to 459 
be tested we included only species for which future cognitive data were potentially 460 
obtainable because those species were available for study in an accessible setting, and (2) 461 
we required that data already had been collected for one of the species in each pair, thus 462 
reducing the amount of data required to generate paired comparisons.  By expanding or 463 
narrowing the focus of the targeting process in this manner, pairs of species were 464 
identified that provide the strongest statistical comparisons and incorporate real-world 465 
limitations, such as species availability, whether two species can validly be compared on 466 
the same task, and the testing time needed for each comparison (see Table 2).   467 
The pairings in Table 2 highlight several important issues.  First, although closely 468 
related species typically provide good comparisons, much stronger statistical 469 
comparisons can be determined using the phylogenetic targeting process.  For example, 470 
imagine that a researcher had recently collected data from Cebus apella, a capuchin 471 
monkey, on the example inhibitory control task.  One closely related species readily 472 
available for study (and comparison) is Saimiri sciureus, the common squirrel monkey.  473 
Although Cebus apella and Saimiri sciureus are closely related and both accessible for 474 
cognitive research, they offer little contrast in relative brain size and consequently, little 475 
power to test the hypothesis that large relative brain size is associated with better 476 
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performance on the inhibitory control task. The weakness of this contrast is reflected in 477 
the summed score for this pairing (0.18). In contrast, phylogenetic targeting indicates that 478 
Callithrix jacchus - another species readily available for study - offers a far superior 479 
contrast in brain size as reflected by the much higher summed score (0.43).  If the 480 
researcher wants to add a single New World primate for comparison to Cebus apella, 481 
then Callithrix jacchus provides more statistical power than Saimiri sciureus. 482 
Second, the pairings shown in Table 2 reveal that there are other important factors 483 
that a comparative psychologist may wish to consider before accepting the comparisons 484 
suggested by the targeting process.  For example, the initial suggested comparisons 485 
include the odd pairing of the nocturnal, solitary aye-aye (Daubentonia 486 
madagascariensis), with the diurnal, fission-fusion spider monkey (Ateles geoffroyi).  487 
Should these species be directly compared using the same task?  If the researcher 488 
concludes not, the targeting process could be performed again with additional inclusion 489 
criteria to generate the pairs.  For example, pairs could be restricted to species with the 490 
same activity pattern (i.e. diurnal or nocturnal) to avoid pairing species that likely differ 491 
greatly in their visual acuity  (particular pairs can also be eliminated manually).  Because 492 
phylogenetic targeting allows users to focus on the variable of interest, while 493 
simultaneously controlling for other potential confounds or testing constraints, it confers 494 
flexibility and statistical power for designing comparative tests.       495 
Research Methods 496 
The phylogenetic methods reviewed above will allow comparative psychologists 497 
to quantitatively probe many exciting questions regarding the evolution of cognition. 498 
While phylogenetic comparative methods have been applied to the study of brain 499 
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evolution (e.g. Barton 1998; Dunbar 1998b; Deaner et al. 2000; Deaner et al. 2007; 500 
Lindenfors et al. 2007; Isler and van Schaik 2009), with few exceptions (e.g. Amici et al. 501 
2008; Shultz and Dunbar 2010) they have yet to be applied to systematic investigations of 502 
cognitive variation between species as measured through behavioral assays.  To increase 503 
our ability to use phylogenetic methods to study cognition we will need to generate large 504 
datasets representing diverse species, which requires the coordination of multiple 505 
research groups that have access to these species.  We will also need to consider how to 506 
assess cognition as a trait, representative of a species ability to solve a particular problem. 507 
In this section we outline several practices that will facilitate success. 508 
Cognition as a trait. Many phylogenetic comparative methods address patterns of 509 
trait evolution, or the relationship between a set of traits.  Thus one major challenge is for 510 
comparative psychologists to develop dependent measures that can meaningfully be 511 
interpreted as traits.  In some rare cases it is possible that performance on a single task 512 
may meet this criterion. However in many cases it is domains of cognition rather than 513 
performance on single tasks that is most interesting for comparative analysis (e.g. 514 
Herrmann et al. 2007). One potential solution to this challenge is the use of composite 515 
measures, derived from multiple tasks designed to measure cognitive abilities in a given 516 
domain.  For example, Amici and colleagues (2008) compared 7 primate species on 5 517 
different tasks that assess inhibitory control. Species were ranked within each task, and 518 
these ranks were averaged across tasks to approximate relative capacities for inhibitory 519 
control.  520 
Collaboration. The majority of comparative psychologists study only one or a few 521 
species (e.g. due to the cost of establishing and maintaining a conventional laboratory 522 
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population).  In the context of comparative research, this means that the coordination of 523 
multiple research groups is required to compile data across a large number of species. At 524 
present there have been few attempts at this level of collaboration and more typically, one 525 
group’s published methods are adopted and modified by other groups for future studies.  526 
While this process promotes the iterative refinement of experimental procedures, with 527 
each study building on the former’s methods, it prevents broad coordinated comparison 528 
because testing methods end up differing among research groups. We believe that one 529 
promising mechanism to generate these datasets is through the effort of collaborative 530 
working groups, such as those sponsored by the National Evolutionary Synthesis Center 531 
(NESCent). In these collaborations, participating research groups first agree on methods 532 
appropriate for the range of species to be tested (via discussion, piloting, and sharing 533 
videos of pilot trials), and subsequently collect data (simultaneously) to make rapid 534 
progress on the designated research question.  The results of these studies can then be 535 
shared and analyzed using the phylogenetic methods outlined above. Sharing can be 536 
facilitated by use of wiki pages and other forms of online communication.   537 
One major advantage of these collaborative papers is that the raw data for many 538 
species can be presented, analyzed, and discussed comparatively and comprehensively in 539 
a single article.  This process helps us escape the disadvantages of only publishing (or not 540 
publishing!) data from species separately, in different journals, where the comparative 541 
significance of such work is often lost.  For example, convincing null results (i.e. a 542 
species fails to solve a problem that is related to problems it is successful with and is 543 
motivated to solve) frequently remain unpublished and are often considered 544 
uninteresting, or difficult to interpret when considered in isolation.  However, the same 545 
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results provide valuable information about inter-specific cognitive variation when 546 
considered in parallel with data from other species that performed better on the same 547 
task. Collaborative working groups can assure that all such results are published together 548 
and presented in a way most fruitful for comparative analysis.  Although this level of 549 
collaboration is currently unusual for comparative psychologists, we should find 550 
inspiration in other large-scale collaborations that have required unprecedented 551 
cooperation from independent contributors including GenBank (Benson et al. 2010) the 552 
Human Genome Diversity Project (Cann et al. 2002), the Large Hadron Collider (Atlas 553 
Collaboration 2010), and cross-cultural studies of economic behavior (Henrich et al. 554 
2005). 555 
Methods. Because time and access to animals are limiting resources in 556 
comparative psychology, these collaborative endeavors should not impose undue burdens 557 
on participating research groups.  For this reason we suspect that the first generation of 558 
broad comparative studies will be most successful if they employ testing procedures that 559 
(1) minimize or eliminate the need for training, (2) require few trials/sessions per subject, 560 
and (3) are easily implemented with few methodological modifications across species 561 
(e.g.   Tomasello et al. 1998; Amici et al. 2009; Sandel et al. 2011).  By developing 562 
methods that meet these criteria researchers can contribute to working groups in a manner 563 
that is minimally disruptive to each participating group’s primary research focus.  Once a 564 
variety of such methods are available they can potentially be deployed as a larger battery 565 
(e.g.  Herrmann et al. 2007; Herrmann et al. 2010a) to examine how different cognitive 566 
skills evolve relative to one another across species.  567 
A second methodological concern in comparative studies is how to adapt each 568 
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cognitive task for use with diverse species. Undoubtedly, there is no single method that 569 
can be applied without bias across taxa (Bitterman 1975; Savage and Snowdon 1989).  570 
Therefore, comparative psychologists will need to focus on standardizing the essential 571 
components of each task while allowing for variation in other parameters required for a 572 
valid comparison between species.  For example, it will be important to establish 573 
consistent warm-up criteria for entry into the test to assure that all subjects are motivated, 574 
and possess a basic understanding of the test’s core features (e.g. searching for food in 575 
one of multiple possible hiding locations). However, other features of the task such as the 576 
apparatus size (for species of different body sizes) or the test response (for species that 577 
respond using different appendages, such as trunks, hands, beaks or noses) will 578 
necessarily vary between species.  579 
Once an appropriate task is identified, the task may prove so easy (or difficult) for 580 
some species that large amounts of meaningful variation may be masked by the method’s 581 
bluntness.  In other words, variation in the underlying cognitive abilities may be obscured 582 
due to ceiling or floor effects in certain species (Shettleworth 2010). This problem can be 583 
overcome by using a double-tiered approach that adjusts the difficulty of testing based on 584 
the performance of different clades on an initial comparison.  For example, imagine that a 585 
range of primates participated in a gaze following task that simply measured whether 586 
subjects co-oriented with an individual that oriented her head to look upward.  Suppose 587 
that all apes tested in this procedure followed gaze at similarly high rates, but no 588 
prosimian species ever co-oriented.  Although this initial result reveals only large-scale 589 
differences among distantly related taxa (e.g. all apes, but no prosimians, follow gaze), 590 
we could re-test all the species with a second measure(s) that would be tailored to reveal 591 
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variation within each clade.  For example, apes could be compared to one another in a 592 
more difficult task measuring sensitivity to subtle eye movements, while prosimians 593 
could be compared to one another in a simpler task measuring only if subjects recognize 594 
whether they are being watched (for a review of species diversity in gaze sensitivity see 595 
Rosati and Hare 2009; Fitch et al. 2010) . Although these secondary measures would be 596 
different for apes and prosimians, the results could still be analyzed comprehensively 597 
using phylogenetic techniques. For example, this secondary measure can test hypotheses 598 
regarding correlated evolution that rely on variation between pairs of close genetic 599 
relatives as opposed to comparisons across all the species.  Is it that within each clade, 600 
species living in larger social groups exhibit enhanced sensitivity to signals of others’ 601 
visual attention? 602 
A second source of inevitable variation will be differences in “contextual 603 
variables” between species and testing sites.  For example, species will differ in their 604 
food motivation, perceptual mechanisms, attention, experimental experience, and housing 605 
conditions, all of which may affect behavioral results (Macphail 1987). Several cross-606 
laboratory studies of inbred mouse behavior have produced significantly different results 607 
across laboratories despite rigorous standardization of the husbandry conditions, 608 
apparatus, and testing protocols (Crabbe et al. 1999; Lewejohann et al. 2006; Richter et 609 
al. 2011). Therefore, at least in the case of rodents, subtle differences between 610 
laboratories may lead to results with low external validity. However, many other studies 611 
of animal cognition have produced highly similar results in different populations (e.g. 612 
mirror self recognition - reviewed in Povinelli et al. 1993; point following in dogs - 613 
reviewed in Miklosi and Soproni 2006; perspective taking in chimpanzees - reviewed in 614 
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Hare 2011; and species differences have been replicated across multiple paradigms and 615 
populations (e.g. spatial cognition in birds - Shettleworth 1995; risk preferences in apes – 616 
Heilbronner et al. 2008; Rosati and Hare 2011). Therefore, one method to assess the role 617 
of contextual variables will be to include multiple populations of a single species (when 618 
possible). The magnitude of intraspecific-population differences can then be compared to 619 
that of any interspecific differences.  If intraspecific variation is large relative to 620 
interspecific variation, species differences should be interpreted with great caution.  621 
Similarly, replication with the same subjects can address whether the patterns observed 622 
are repeatable across time. 623 
Species and study sites. At present, we have identified many exciting evolutionary 624 
hypotheses from comparisons of small sets of species.  However, our ability to rigorously 625 
test these hypotheses will rely on comparative work at a much larger scale. For example, 626 
researchers have now identified links between feeding ecology and performance on 627 
memory tests (Balda and Kamil 1989; Shettleworth 1990; Clayton and Krebs 1994; 628 
Jacobs and Spencer 1994; Macdonald 1997), social dominance hierarchies and transitive 629 
reasoning (Bond et al. 2003; Paz-y-Miño et al. 2004; Grosenick et al. 2007; MacLean et 630 
al. 2008; Bond et al. 2010), domestication’s effect on cognition (Hare et al. 2002; Hare et 631 
al. 2005; Kaminski et al. 2005; Lewejohann et al. 2010; Proops et al. 2010), fission-632 
fusion dynamics and inhibitory control (Amici et al. 2008; Aureli et al. 2008; Amici et al. 633 
2009), and social relationships and cooperative problem solving (Hare et al. 2007; Drea 634 
and Carter 2009). In order to determine whether these associations reflect robust 635 
evolutionary relationships, we will need to explore these questions from a phylogenetic 636 
comparative approach. Fortunately, with the aid of new techniques such as phylogenetic 637 
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targeting, comparative psychologists can test these hypotheses with a “top-down” a priori 638 
approach to data collection by selecting species that provide the greatest power for 639 
comparative analysis.   640 
Of course, many of the most interesting species to study may fall outside the 641 
conventional taxonomic focus of comparative psychology.  Developing creative ways to 642 
study these species will be one of the exciting challenges, and facilitating collaboration 643 
between researchers, zoos, and animal sanctuaries will be a fruitful way to access species 644 
normally unavailable to study (e.g.  Wright 1972; Macdonald 1997; Burke et al. 2002; 645 
Plotnik et al. 2006; Albiach-Serrano et al. 2007; Fredman and Whiten 2008; Manrod et 646 
al. 2008; Waisman and Jacobs 2008; Proops et al. 2009; Jaakkola et al. 2010; Kuba et al. 647 
2010; Muller 2010; Woods and Hare 2010; Wobber and Hare 2011). To do so, 648 
comparative psychologists will need to expand beyond the “model” species approach 649 
(Rosati and Hare 2009) to gain access to non-conventional test species that are of the 650 
greatest theoretical interest.  651 
Summary 652 
  Having made progress toward revealing the development and causal 653 
mechanisms of problem-solving skills in animals, we are now in a position to 654 
quantitatively examine Tinbergen’s other two questions for biological analysis: the 655 
phylogenetic distribution and function of cognitive traits.  By adding phylogenetic 656 
techniques to our tool kit, comparative psychologists can build on past success by 657 
incorporating tests of correlated trait evolution, phylogenetic signal, and ancestral state 658 
reconstruction into our research. Further, we can use methods such as phylogenetic 659 
targeting when deciding which species to study. Taken together, the use of phylogenetic 660 
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techniques and the development of large-scale collaborations to compare dozens of 661 
species across multiple research groups, institutions, and countries will revolutionize 662 
evolutionary studies of cognition.  In doing so we stand to gain an understanding of how 663 
cognition evolves in nonhumans, as well as a better understanding of the evolutionary 664 
processes that gave rise to the human mind.  665 
  666 
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Table 1.   Resources for further information about phylogenetic comparative 1101 methods 1102 
Category Title Reference / URL 
Books 
The Comparative Method in Evolutionary Biology Harvey, P. H., & Pagel, M. D. Oxford University Press (1991) 
Phylogenies and the Comparative Method in Animal 
Behavior 
Martins, E. P.  
Oxford University Press (1996) 
Inferring Phylogenies Felsenstein, J.  Sinauer Associates (2004) 
The Comparative Approach in Evolutionary 
Anthropology and Biology 
Nunn, C. L.  
The University of Chicago Press (2011) 
Articles 
Phylogenies and the Comparative Method Felsenstein, J. The American Naturalist (1985) 
Inferring the Historical Patterns of Biological 
Evolution 
Pagel, M. 
Nature  (1999) 
Comparative Methods for Studying Primate 
Adaptation and Allometry 
Nunn, C. L., & Barton, R. A.  
Evolutionary Anthropology (2001) 
Phylogenetic Analysis and Comparative Data: A 
Test and Review of Evidence 
Freckleton, R. P., Harvey, P. H., & Pagel, M.  
The American Naturalist (2002) 
Testing for Phylogenetic Signal in Comparative 
Data: Behavioral Traits are More Labile 
Blomberg, S. P., Garland, T., & Ives, A. R.  
Evolution (2003) 
Phylogenetic Approaches in Comparative 
Physiology 
Garland, T., Bennett, A. F., & Rezende, E. L.  
Journal of Experimental Biology (2005) 
Online 
resources 
Comparative Methods in R http://phytools.blogspot.com/ 
Dechronization - phylogenetics blog http://treethinkers.blogspot.com/ 
NESCent - Comparative Methods in R tutorial http://www.r-phylo.org/ 
R-sig-phylo mailing list (comparative methods in R) https://stat.ethz.ch/mailman/listinfo/r-sig-phylo 
Training 
Opportunities 
AnthroTree Workshop http://www.anthrotreeworkshop.info/ 
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Table 2. The output of the targeting process displays the ‘maximal pairings,’ trait 1106 
differences for each pair (e.g. log ECV brain residuals), and the score for each pairing.  1107 
The score is a measure of each pair’s strength to test the target hypothesis based on 1108 
phylogenetic relatedness and ECV variation.  The species pairings are listed in order of 1109 
decreasing strength to test the target hypothesize, providing a guide for which ‘new 1110 
species’ should be the highest priorities for future testing.  The targeting process also 1111 
allows researchers to customize species pairings using simple user-defined variables. The 1112 
pairings in this table were generated using the criteria 1) there were extant data on one 1113 
species in the pair, and 2) that the ‘new species’ to be studied was available for cognitive 1114 
testing.  When targeting species for cognitive studies one can generate additional criteria 1115 
to assure that each pair provides a good comparison using the same behavioral task.  For 1116 
example, a user could require that both species exhibit the same activity pattern 1117 
(diurnal/nocturnal), which would avoid the pairing of species such as the aye-aye 1118 
(Daubentonia) and spider monkey (Ateles) below. 1119 
New Species To Be Studied Already Studied Species Log ECV Difference Score 
Microcebus murinus Propithecus verreauxi 1.107 0.536 
Miopithecus talapoin Gorilla gorilla 0.963 0.466 
Callithrix jacchus Cebus apella 0.878 0.425 
Mandrillus sphinx Macaca fascicularis 0.503 0.244 
Daubentonia madagascariensis Ateles geoffroyi 0.330 0.160 
Hapalemur griseus Varecia variegata 0.300 0.145 
Eulemur rubriventer Eulemur macaco  0.132 0.064 
Eulemur fulvus Eulemur mongoz 0.086 0.042 
* ECV = Endocranial Volume 1120 
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Figure Captions 1122 
Figure 1. An overview of some evolutionary questions relevant to comparative 1123 
psychology and the phylogenetic comparative methods designed to address them. The 1124 
shaded circles in the top panel depict species similarity along a continuous quantitative 1125 
dimension (e.g. percent correct responses in the example inhibitory control task). The leaf 1126 
and fruit icons in the second panel represent different dietary strategies that could be 1127 
tested for their association with performance on a cognitive task.  The third panel shows 1128 
the root node on a phylogeny, representing an extinct species for which the ancestral 1129 
cognitive ability could be predicted using data from extant species along the tips of the 1130 
phylogeny.   The fourth panel illustrates a scenario in which there are only cognitive data 1131 
for two species in the phylogeny.  Phylogenetic targeting facilitates the strategic choice of 1132 
which additional species are most interesting to test in order to evaluate an evolutionary 1133 
hypothesis. 1134 
 1135 
Figure 2. A phylogeny of the 12 primate species comprising the example data set. As a 1136 
subject watched, food was placed behind a transparent barrier. To successfully retrieve 1137 
the food, subjects needed to resist reaching directly for the food (i.e. bumping into the 1138 
transparent barrier) and instead, perform a detour around the barrier. Mean percent 1139 
correct responses (because the total number of trials varied between species) are shown 1140 
for each species. Data were pooled from similar tasks used by Amici et al. (2008), and 1141 
MacLean et al. (unpublished data) and are analyzed here for illustrative purposes. 1142 
 1143 
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Figure 3. Rescaled phylogenetic trees transformed at A) λ = 0, B) λ = 0.5, and C) λ = 1. 1144 
When λ  = 0, all internal branches are rescaled to zero, which indicates that the trait 1145 
distribution among the species shows no association with phylogeny (i.e., a star 1146 
phylogeny; all the branches emanate from a single node, modeling all species as equally 1147 
related to one another). When λ  = 1, branch lengths reflect the actual divergence dates 1148 
for each lineage, indicating that variance in the trait has accumulated over time exactly as 1149 
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Figure 1. 1167 
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